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MAINTAINING THE ATTORNEY'S INDEPENDENT
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT-CANON 5
I. INTRODUCTION
The thrust of Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility1 is that the attorney should exercise his professional judg-
ment solely for the benefit of his client and free of influences from
all other sources. 2 The Discplinary Rules,3 in establishing the
minimum standards of conduct for the practicing attorney,4 are in-
tended to insure the client the undivided loyalty of his attorney.5
Typical situations that may impair the attorney's judgment include
those in which an attorney enters into a business transaction
with his client or undertakes the representation of multiple clients.
These situations thus surface as areas of "potentially differing in-
terests"6 within the meaning of Canon 5.
While Pennsylvania courts have examined the situation in which
an attorney purchases property from his client with respect to the
legal validity of the transaction,7 the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility has expanded the scope of inquiry by requiring the client's
express consent after full disclosure.8 The Code also provides the
practicing attorney with a standard in undertaking and continuing
representation of multiple clients.' Focusing on the situations
where the representation involves multiple plaintiffs in civil cases
or criminal co-defendants, an attempt is made herein to demon-
strate how Pennsylvania courts have restricted multiple client
representation and whether these restrictions are consistent with
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 1969 [hereinafter
cited as ABA CODE].
2. Canon 5 states "a lawyer should exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client." See ABA CODE, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in gen-
eral terms the standards of professional conduct expected of law-
yers in their relationships with the public, with the legal system,
and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts
from which the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules
are derived.
3. ABA CODE, DISCIPLINARY RULEs [hereinafter cited as DR].
4. ABA CODE, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
5. See ABA CODE, ETHIcAL CONSIDERATIONS [hereinafter cited as EC].
EC5-1 includes interests of the attorney and interests of other clients as po-
tential sources of influence on the attorney's professional judgment.
6. When referred to in this Comment, "differing interests" shall mean
interests which are "conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discord-
ant." EC5-14.
7. See notes 15-28 and accompanying text inTa.
8. DR5-104(A).
9. DR5-105.
the dictates of Canon 5. It has been in the area of multiple repre-
sentation that disqualification of counsel has been effective in pre-
venting not only the representation of differing interests, but also
representation involving the appearances of impropriety.' 0 The
ramifications of disqualification will be analyzed in light of the es-
tablishment of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania."
II. INTERESTS OF THE ATToRNEY-DR5-104(A)
DR5-104, by limiting an attorney's business relations with a
client, is intended to prevent the situation in which an attorney's in-
dependent professional judgment, on behalf of the client, might be
impaired by his own interests. The provisions of DR5-104 (A) ex-
pressly proscribe business transactions between attorney and client
without the client's consent after full disclosure, if (1) they have
differing interests therein, and (2) the client expects the lawyer
to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of
the client. Since the "[d]isciplinary [r]ules state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being sub-
ject to disciplinary action,"' 2 compliance with DR5-104 (A) should
suffice to insure that the lawyer's professional judgment will not
be impaired, to the client's detriment, when he does enter into a
business transaction with a client.
Limiting business relations between the attorney and client is
a method to insure that the lawyer exercises his judgment solely
for the benefit of his client, and is not intended as a prohibition
on his freedom to contract. The very nature of the transaction
wherein an attorney purchases property from his client necessarily
involves "differing interests" within the meaning of the Code. s
But regardless of the existence of differing interests, unless the
client has the expectation that his attorney will act for the protec-
tion of his interests, attorney and client may enter into this type
of transaction with something less than full disclosure of all the
circumstances by the attorney. 14 This expectation of protection
10. See notes 115-149 and accompanying text infra.
11. PA. R. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Preamble [hereinafter cited as
ENFORCEMENT R.].
12. ABA CODE, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
13. See note 6 supra. It is the interest of the client-seller to obtain
the largest possible price for the property while the attorney-purchaser is
interested in securing the property at the least possible price.
14. See Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962). Plain-
tiffs loaned money to their attorney to finance a real estate venture. The
attorney however improperly secured repayment of this debt. Although
recognizing the attorney's fiduciary duty to his client, the court noted that
it was a very substantial transaction and plaintiffs appeared to be intelli-
gent people. The court held that it was neither reasonable nor practical
to suppose that the attorney would represent his clients' intersts to the ex-
clusion of his own and that it was clearly apparent that the attorney was
dealing in his own interest.
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thus provides the key to bringing DR5-104(A) into effect and with
it the requirement for a full disclosure by the attorney. Applica-
tion of DR5-104(A) raises two issues: Is the client justified in
expecting that his attorney will act to protect his interests, and
what is the nature of the full disclosure required?
Because "differing interests" are inherent in the situation in
which an attorney purchases property from his client, courts have
given such transactions rather careful scrutiny.15 The nature of
the attorney-client relationship gives rise to the presumption that
the attorney has the power to influence his client strongly,8 and
for this reason, courts will pronounce the transaction constructive
fraud and void unless fair and conscionable.' 7 An attorney may
not secure undue advantages, bargains, or gratuities by availing
himself of the good nature, credibility or necessity of a person re-
posing trust and confidence in him.' Thus, where the attorney
conceals the true condition of the property at the time of procuring
a conveyance, and in reliance on his good faith the client refrains
from making inquiries of others, the court will set the transaction
aside. 19 The "arm's length rule," which permits the parties to an
ordinary business transaction to outtrade or outmaneuver the other
and obtain an advantage at the expense of candor, is entirely in-
applicable to business dealings or transactions between the attorney
and his client.20 In Hertzog v. Morgan,2' the court applied an ob-
15. Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 676 (1971).
16. Kribbs v. Jackson, 387 Pa. 611, 622, 129 A.2d 490, 496 (1957), citing
Shoemaker v. Stiles, 102 Pa. 549, 553 (1883); Martin's Petition, 237 Pa, 159,
160-61, 85 A. 88 (1912); Nevin v. State Bank of Elizabeth, 115 Pa. Super.
92, 98, 174 A. 618, 620 (1934); Gregory v. Huslander, 10 Lack. J. 291, 294
(Pa. C.P. 1907).
17. Kribbs v. Jackson, 387 Pa. 611, 622, 129 A.2d 490, 496 (1957), citing
Shoemaker v. Stiles, 102 Pa. 549, 553 (1883); Maguire v. Wheeler, 300 Pa.
513, 520, 150 A. 882, 884 (1930); Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa. 489 (1850) (pro-
visions for high fiduciary fees will be set aside when the attorney preparing
the instrument is named as one of the trustees and it is shown that un-
bounded influence was exerted); Nevin v. State Bank of Elizabeth, 115 Pa.
Super. 92, 99, 174 A. 618, 620 (1934).
18. Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa. 512, 518-19 (1878); O'Donnell v. Breck,
7 Pa. Super. 24, 27 (1898).
19. See, e.g., Spencer and Newbold's Appeal, 80 Pa. 317 (1876); Hert-
zog v. Morgan, 19 Fay. L.J. 141 (Pa. C.P. 1956) (attorney concealed exist-
ence of marketable coal).
20. In re Alexander's Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 169, 175-76 (Phila. 1938).
See also Kribbs v. Jackson, 387 Pa. 611, 612, 129 A.2d 490, 495-96 (1957):
No shadow of anything like deception or unfair dealing upon the
part of the attorney with his client will be countenanced because
the attorney-client relationship is so confidential in its nature that
it calls for the exercise of the most perfect good faith.
In Points v. Gibboney, 340 Pa. 522, 17 A.2d 365 (1941), the attorney induced
jective standard to the situation in which an attorney purchases
property from his client. To sustain such a transaction the attorney
must show the payment of an "adequate consideration," even if
both parties believed at the time that it was adequate. 22 Although
this case was decided before the promulgation of the Code, its
reasoning is equally applicable today. Despite the fact that the
attorney may be guilty of no actual misconduct, he is to conduct
himself so as to avoid even the appearance of professional im-
propriety.
23
On the other hand, when the parties act in good faith with
a full understanding of what they are doing, the attorney will not
be charged with misconduct merely because the transaction is a
profitable one.2 4 If the client has full knowledge of all material
facts, 25 the consideration is adequate, 26 and there is no overreach-
ing,2 17 the transaction will be upheld. The fact that the client him-
self solicited the deal helps dispel any appearance of overreaching. 2
Pennsylvania courts have provided the justification for the
client's expectation that his interests will be protected in a business
transaction with his attorney. The validity of a transaction
wherein the attorney purchases property from his client depends
the executrix and others to sign a judgment note to him assuming the debts
of the estate as individuals. Placing the burden on the attorney to show
that he had not obtained personal advantage by misrepresenting the legal
situation to his clients, the court held:
While he testified that he constantly cautioned appellant not to use
her personal funds for payment of debts of the estate, it seemed
strange that he ignored this advice in the instant where his own
claim was concerned and induced her to assume just such a per-
sonal liability.
Id. at 527, 17 A.2d at 367.
21. 19 Fay. L.J. 141 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
22. Id. at 146.
23. Canon 9 provides that a lawyer should avoid even the appearance
of professional impropriety. The ethical considerations under that canon
provide, inter alia: "Every lawyer owes a solemn duty . .. to strive to
avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of im-
propriety." EC9-6 (footnote omitted). "On occasion, ethical conduct of a
lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical." EC9-1.
24. See, e.g., Appeal of Burke, 378 Pa. 616, 634-35, 108 A.2d 58, 67-68
(1954) (attorneys sought the advice of independent counsel and offered to
withdraw; the client acquiesced to the development plans and initiated the
action only when the project proved profitable); Bersch v. Rust, 249 Pa.
512, 514, 95 A.2d 108, 109 (1915) (the court held that it is not fraudulent
per se for an attorney to take a deed direct from his client merely because
the value of the real estate was worth more than the attorney's services).
But see notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Stevenson, 204 Pa. 194, 195, 53 A. 746 (1902);
Smythe v. O'Brien and Ashley, 109 Pa. 223, 229, 47 A. 1102, 1104 (1901).
26. See, e.g., Smith v. Stevenson, 204 Pa. 194, 195, 53 A. 746 (1902);
Hertzog v. Morgan, 10 Fay. L.J. 141 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
27. See, e.g., Myers v. Luzerne Co., 124 F. 436, 440 (M.D. Pa. 1903);
Smith v. Stevenson, 204 Pa. 194, 195, 53 A. 746 (1902).
28. Myers v. Luzerne Co., 124 F. 436, 440 (M.D. Pa. 1903). However,
a contract today by which the attorney purchases the interest of his client
in a claim in litigation would be a violation of DRS-103 (A) under the Code.
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upon a full disclosure of all material facts. DR5-104(A) does not
permit anything less and, in this respect, is consistent with the hold-
ings of the courts. It would appear, however, that the full dis-
closure required by DR5-104(A) goes beyond the disclosure neces-
sary for a valid transaction between attorney and client.
This expansion of the "full disclosure" requirement only be-
comes apparent when viewed in relation to the stated purpose of
Canon 5: "A lawyer should exercise independent professional judg-
ment on behalf of a client." Like DR5-101(A),29 DR5-104(A) is in-
tended to guard against those situations in which an attorney's own
interests might interfere with his professional judgment to the
detriment of the client. The "express consent after full disclosure"
required by DR5-101 (A) refers to the client's awareness and under-
standing of all circumstances that may tend to interfere with
representation by that particular attorney. Full disclosure under
DR5-101 (A) thus provides an opportunity for the client to evaluate
the situation and to seek other representation if the situation would
appear to so demand. Viewed in this light, "express consent after
full disclosure" required under DR5-104(A) seems to envisage the
client having the chance to reassess the wisdom of entering into
a proposed business transaction, and to determine whether the inde-
pendent judgment of his attorney may be affected. Compliance
with DR5-104(A) involves the disclosure of all circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction that may influence the attorney's profes-
sional judgment.3 0 Unless the client has expressly consented to
29. DRS-101 (A) requires the lawyer to refuse to accept employment
when his own "financial, business, property, or personal interests" may im-
pair his independent professional judgment. See In re Anonymous, No. 73-
35B, 1973 Term. (Respondent was a solicitor for his county and various
townships in the county. In this capacity he advised the county commis-
sioners, the county planning board and the various townships on various
matters, including violations of Act 537, the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities
Act. Respondent was also a real estate broker and was in the business of
real estate development and construction. DR's found violated: DR5-
101 (A); DR-102(A) (6)), as reported in The Disciplinary Board of the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, Summaries of Discipline Imposed on Penn-
sylvania Attorneys During The Period November 1, 1972 through June 30,
1974, Summary of Informal Admonitions at 17, July 26, 1974 [hereinafter
cited as Disciplinary Board Summaries].
30. Since there are no available disciplinary board rulings, a hypo-
thetical will illustrate a possible violation of DR5-105 (A). If A (attorney)
purchases property from C (client), disclosure by A of coal reserves, the
existence of which is unknown by C, is required by the courts for an en-
forceable contract between A and C. Compliance with DR5-104(A) would
require more from A. If A desires to sell the land to a coal mining opera-
tion, even though an adequate price has been agreed upon for the land by
the transaction after such a full disclosure, the attorney seemingly
will be subject to disciplinary action.3 '
III. INTERESTS OF OTHER CLIEN rs-DR5-105
DR5-105 directs the attorney to refuse or to discontinue em-
ployment if the interests of another client may impair his inde-
pendent professional judgment. The propriety of multiple client
representation, however, was once considered a question of judg-
ment for the individual practitioner. 32 The decision of the court
in Road in Lower Saucon Township33 appears to be the first time
a Pennsylvania court held that representation in litigation of ad-
verse interests, though acceptable to the parties concerned, is still
improper.
An appearance by an attorney for both sides of a con-
troverted matter is totally and wholly unauthorized, and
any judgment, order or decree adversely obtained under it,
or which is other than any merely formal judgment, order,
and decree, signed in the presence of both parties, or upon
their written application, is absolutely void.
3 4
In refusing to sanction dual representation of adverse or conflicting
interests, the court rested its opinion "on the grounds of public
policy, not because he [the attorney] may intend to deceive one
or the other [client]."35
The early cases of conflicting interests relied for their authority
on decisions involving the question of whether the same person may
be the agent in private litigation for both parties, without the con-
sent of both.3 6 Confronted with this question, the court in Ever-
hart v. Searle3 7 stated:
We have the authority of Holy Writ for saying that 'no
man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the
one, and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and
A and C, he might be unwilling to vigorously prosecute a claim that C has
against the company. C must be made aware of potential uses of the land
by A which might impair A's judgment on C's behalf.
31. ENF RCEMEN-T R. 17-3, which makes any violation of the DR's
grounds for discipline.
32. Costello's Estate, 16 Phila. 242 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1883). The same
counsel represented several of the residuary legatees and heirs at law of the
testator. He also represented as counsel the estate of a deceased legatee and
heir, under whose will he was both executor and legatee. As such executor
he purchased a judgment against the original decedent, and in that capacity
he claimed and was awarded the full amount of the judgment. The court
refrained from deciding "whether in any case, a counsel acting for two par-
ties, may do an act on behalf of one and to the prejudice of the other, which
might be properly done by an adversary counsel."
33. 5 North. 66 (Pa. C.P. 1895).
34. Id. at 72.
35. Id. at 73.
36. See, e.g., Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 20 A. 513 (1890); Everhart
v. Searle, 71 Pa. 257 (1872).
37. 71 Pa. 257 (1872).
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despise the other.' All human experience sanctions the un-
doubted truth and purity of this philosophy, and it is re-
ceived as a cardinal principle in every system of enlight-
ened jurisprudence.
38
Although consensual waiver of the rule restricting an agent from
acting for both parties in a private transaction was possible, it was
considered essential that there be an express agreement to do So.3
9
Such agreement could not be inferred from knowledge of the fact
that such rule had been violated, or from silence or failure to dis-
sent.
40
Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides "it is
unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all given after full disclosure of the facts."41 Canon 5
of the Code has broadened the multiple representation provisions
of its predecessor. Instead of dealing in terms of "conflicting inter-
ests," the Code considers the more inclusive "differing interests.'
42
And while discouraging the representation of multiple clients, DR5-
105 does permit multiple representation by an attorney
if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the in-
terest of each and if each consents to the representation
after full disclosure of the possible effect of such represen-
tation on the exercise of his independent professional judg-
ment on behalf of each.
48
Thus express consent after a full disclosure is not in itself sufficient.
Both requirements must be satisfied to prevent multiple repre-
sentation from being a violation of DR5-105.
Under the Code, the practicing attorney is faced with two sub-
jective questions with respect to multiple representation: Will
his professional judgment be adversely affected, and can he ade-
quately represent each client? If these can be resolved, the attorney
must provide each client with "the opportunity to evaluate his need
for representation free of any potential conflict and to obtain other
counsel if he so desires. '44 While an attorney should never repre-
sent in litigation clients with differing interests,45 EC5-15 directs
38. Id. at 259.
39. Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 443, 20 A. 513, 515 (1890).
40. Id.
41. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Enics No. 6.
42. See note 6 supra. The Canons made no attempt to define "con-
flicting interests" other than the statement in Canon 6: "Within the mean-
ing of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose."
43. DR5-105(C) (emphasis added).
44. EC5-16.
45. EC5-15. See, e.g., Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zoning Board of
the attorney to avoid the representation of clients with even "poten-
tially differing interests" because of the likelihood that these inter-
ests will become "actually differing."
Situations involving "potentially differing interests" within the
sphere of DR5-105 have arisen, inter alia, when an attorney has
undertaken or continued representation of multiple plaintiffs or
criminal codefendants. Removal of counsel by the court is an alter-
native to the subjective decision by the attorney as to the propriety
of multiple representation.
A. Multiple Plaintiffs
A recurring situation involving "differing interests" is that in
which an attorney undertakes the representation of multiple plain-
tiffs in a personal injury case, and one of the co-plaintiffs is joined
as an additional defendant. The general rule emerging from Penn-
sylvania case law is that the same attorney cannot represent a party
plaintiff who has been joined as an additional defendant.46 When
limited in application to the situations for which it is intended, this
rule is in harmony with the provisions of Canon 5 of the Code.
The Pennsylvania rule had its real beginnings in Bossler v. Wil-
son,47 a case in which the same attorney represented the plaintiff
in her cause of action and an additional defendant in his defense
to the claims of both the plaintiff and the original defendant. Va-
cating judgments for the original defendant and against the addi-
tional defendant, the court held that
[the fact] that the attorney who appeared at the trial and
presented the claim of the plaintiff against both defendants
appeared therein as counsel for the additional defendant in
his defense to the plaintiff's claim . invalidates the trial
had as to both defendants.
41
Finding the interests of the parties to have been adverse and citing
Holy Writ 49 as authority, the court held that an attorney cannot
appear for both parties in a controverted matter.5  Although this
Adjustment of Horsham Township, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 499, 275 A.2d
896 (1971). The court held it to be improper for the same person to act
as counsel for both the zoning board and the municipality since it gives
rise to an unnecessary and unwarranted occasion for partiality.
46. Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 135 A.2d 252
(1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958); Allen v. Duignan, 191 Pa. Super.
608, 159 A.2d 21 (1960); Stanford v. Casasanta, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 547 (Mercer
1972); Schott v. Senger Transp. Co., 40 Pa. D. & C. 204 (Phila. 1940). But
see Olynik v. Luce, 192 Pa. Super. 312, 162 A.2d 259 (1960).
47. 65 Pa. D. & C. 164 (Phila. 1948).
48. Id. at 170-71.
49. Matthew 6:24; Luke 16:13.
50. Bossler v. Wilson, 65 Pa. D. & C. 164, 171 (Phila. 1948). "No attor-
ney can serve two opposing litigants any more so than one man can serve




case was decided prior to the promulgation of the Code, its holding
is consistent with the objectives of the Code regarding the represen-
tation of adverse interests.5 '
In Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.5 2 the court
applied the Bossler reasoning situation in which multiple plain-
tiffs were represented by the same attorney and one of the
plaintiffs was joined as an additional defendant. Three plaintiffs
sued the Philadelphia Transportation Company for damages for in-
juries sutained in a collision between an automobile and a street-
car. The defendant joined the owner-operator of the automobile
as an additional defendant. Plaintiffs were represented by the
same attorney, who also undertook the representation of the owner-
operator in his capacity as additional defendant. Verdicts were ren-
dered against both defendants, but the trial judge granted a new
trial solely because he failed to satisfy himself that one of the liti-
gants had full knowledge of an existing conflict of interest in his
attorney's representation.53 An appeal was taken on the grounds
that the trial court's action constituted an abuse of discretion.
In considering the claim of abuse of discretion, the court did
not determine as a matter of law whether a conflict of interest
"necessarily" serves to disqualify an attorney from concurrently
representing both of the conflicting interests.54 Interpreting the
Canons of Professional Ethics,55 the court determined the provision
permitting an attorney to represent conflicting interests "by the
express consent of all concerned given after a full disciosure of the
facts" to be inapplicable in the case at bar:
51. EC5-15 directs the attorney against representing in litigation multi-
ple clients with "differing interests" because he cannot adequately represent
the interest of each. See In re Anonymous, No. 29, 1974 Term (Pa. Sup.
Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Sept. 20, 1974). (Respondent was retained by Com-
plainant to file a divorce action on her behalf. She alleged Respondent to
have divided his loyalty between complainant and her husband and to have
acted to Complainant's detriment by obtaining the divorce decree before
a property settlement had been secured. Petition for Discipline was dis-
missed on a finding that failure to obtain a settlement does not amount
to multiple employment in violation of any Disciplinary Rule), as reported
in Disciplinary Board Summaries During the Period July 1, 1974 through
November 30, 1974, at 39.
52. 390 Pa. 231, 135 A.2d 252 (1957).
53. Id. at 233, 135 A.2d at 253.
54. Id. at 234, 135 A.2d at 253. See Note, Whether an Attorney for
Multiple Plaintiffs May Also Represent One of the Plaintiffs in his Role
as Additional Defendant, 19 U. PiTT. L. REv. 653 (1957). The author states
that the use of the word "necessarily" indicates that the court was not lim-
iting itself strictly to the question of trial court discretion.
55. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIUcs No. 6.
[T] here are instances where the conflicts of interest are
so critically adverse as not to admit of one attorney's rep-
resenting both sides. . . . No one could conscionably con-
tend that the same attorney may represent both the plain-
tiff and the defendant in an adversary action. Yet, that is
what is being done in this case.56
Jedwabny recognized the duty of the attorney to refrain from
undertaking representation that involves "differing interests."
But the court refrained from holding that evidence of a conflict
of interest on the part of counsel serves as a matter of law to dis-
qualify him.57 The two cases in which Jedwabny has been applied
to similar factual situations have produced different interpreta-
tions. In Allen v. Duignon,58 the court felt "duty bound" to grant
a new trial because of Jedwabny, 9 even though the case was not
one that would otherwise have warranted interference with the
verdicts. The lower court's action had been determined "exclu-
sively by finding evidence of a conflict of interest on the part of
counsel. °6 0 In Olynik v. Luce,61 however, the court was of the opin-
ion that since the conflict of interest question was raised at the
commencement of the trial and thereupon "noted for the record
that the parties understood the situation and were satisfied, '62 the
issue was rendered moot.
The Olynik decision illustrates the proposition espoused by Jus-
tice Bell in his Jedwabny dissent:
The majority . . . quotes Canon 6 and the Scriptures
to support the conclusion that Atkinson must have one
lawyer in his capacity as plaintiff and another lawyer to
represent him as defendant, and then admits that one law-
yer could represent Atkinson in his capacity as plaintiff
and as defendant if Atkinson were informed of his rights,
risks, and conflicting interests.
6 3
It would appear, however, that Justice Bell misinterpreted the
majority's opinion and that the Olynik decision fails to comply
with the dictates of Jedwabny. The Canons of Professional Ethics
56. Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 235, 135 A.2d
252, 254 (1957) (emphasis added). The attorney in his representation of
his plaintiff clients had a duty to protect the verdict against the additional
defendant. At the same time, however, it was his duty to relieve from
liability the additional defendant whose representation the attorney had
originally undertaken in the action against the transportation company.
57. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
58. 191 Pa. Super. 608, 159 A.2d 21 (1960).
59. Id. at 611, 159 A.2d at 23.
60. Id. at 610, 159 A.2d 22.
61. 192 Pa. Super. 312, 162 A.2d 259 (1960). The owner-operator of
an automobile and his wife instituted a trespass action for damages sus-
tained in an automobile collision, in which defendant Luce was the other
driver. The husband was joined as an additional defendant. The same at-
torney appeared for and represented the husband and wife.
62. Id. at 314, 162 A.2d at 261.




provide, inter alia, that "it is unprofessional to represent conflict-
ing interests except by consent of all given after full disclosure.
4
Jedwabny relied upon this provision, but restricted its application
in situations in which the conflicts are "critically adverse.'0 5 Thus
Jedwabny held that even with the consent of each client, an at-
torney may not represent co-plaintiffs where one of them is joined
as an additional defendant. Canon 5 of the Code gives support to
this proposition, citing the Jedwabny majority in stating "a lawyer
should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing
interests."66 DR5-105 (C) permits the representation of multiple cli-
ents upon their express consent only "if it is obvious that he [the
attorney] can adequately represent the interests of each ... .
When his clients are multiple plaintiffs and one of them is joined
as an additional defendant, the attorney cannot adequately repre-
sent the interests of each. Multiple representation in such a situa-
tion is thus prohibited by the Code regardless of the consent of
all concerned.
However inviting this conclusion may be, it must be restricted
to the situations presented in Jedwabny, Allen, and Olynik. The
prohibition only operates when there is multiple representation
and one of the clients is to be represented in his dual capacity. It
is not applicable in instances in which an attorney represents an
individual client in his capacity as plaintiff and defendant.
Absent other plaintiffs whom the attorney also seeks to
represent, there is no conflict of interest. In both roles the
plaintiff-additional defendant is seeking to prove himself
free of any negligence and to establish the negligence of
the original defendant.
6 7
This self-imposed restriction on the applicability of Jedwabny is
evident in the majority's statement, "obviously, the attorney cannot
serve the opposed interests of his two clients fully and faithfully." 68
When there are cross actions for damages arising out of an
automobile collision and these actions are consolidated for trial, it
64. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Erncs No. 6.
65. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
66. EC5-15.
67. Burish v. Dignon, 416 Pa. 486, 492, 206 A.2d 497, 500 (1965) (con-
curring opinion). The conflict of interest is in the one attorney represent-
ing adverse clients, not in one attorney representing a person who has a role
on both sides of the litigation. Thus the Jedwabny prohibition would not
operate in the situation in which the plaintiff-additional defendant had an
attorney other than the one representing the other plaintiffs.
68. Jedwabny v. Philadephia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 236, 135 A.2d
252, 254 (1957) (emphasis added).
would be erroneous to contend that Jedwabny and the Code require
the two litigants to employ a total of four attorneys. Yet in Burish
v. Dignon, 9 in which a litigant was represented by two attorneys in
his dual capacity as plaintiff and defendant, Chief Justice Bell cited
Jedwabny in dissenting from the majority affirmance of the trial
judge's confining of appellant's closing argument to just one attor-
ney.
70
Chief Justice Bell stated in his dissent to Burish, "I am con-
vinced that Jedwabny should be overruled and I believe the bar
feels the same way."'71 Pennsylvania's adoption of the Code indi-
cates otherwise, however. A problem arises whenever a lawyer is
asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing in-
terests, and the lawyer should resolve all doubts against the pro-
priety of the representation. 72 Where there are co-plaintiffs and
one is joined as an additional defendant, it is obvious that the at-
torney cannot adequately represent the interest of each. 73 Regard-
less of express consent by all concerned, representation by a single
attorney is improper and proscribed by the Code.
B. Criminal Codefendants
A majority of the Pennsylvania cases dealing with the conflict
of interest issue have involved the criminal defendant. The repre-
sentation of multiple defendants by a single court-appointed attor-
ney has been considered with respect to the constitutional right of
effective assistance of counsel. 74 The conflict of interest question,
however, seems more acute in cases where one defendant has re-
69. 416 Pa. 486, 206 A.2d 497 (1965).
70. Id. at 492, 206 A.2d at 499. "In logic and principle this case is ruled
by Jedwabny v. Phila. Transp. Co." Id.
71. Id.
72. EC5-15.
73. The only disciplinary board case to consider this question of mul-
tiple plaintiff-additional defendant representation under DR5-105 is In re
Anonymous, No. 72-26D, 1973 Term. (Respondent was retained to repre-
sent Complainant, the driver, and the two passengers in Complainant's
vehicle as plaintiffs, in a trespass action arising from an auto accident.
Respondent subsequently referred Complainant's claim to other counsel.
He then proceeded to represent the two passengers in an action against
Complainant. There was no indication that Respondent could adequately
represent the interests of all three plaintiffs in the action initiated or that
he had fully disclosed the possible effect of this multiple client representa-
tion on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of
each. Additionally, Respondent failed to communicate adequately with
Complainant. 'DR's found violated: DR5-105 (A) (C); DR6-101 (A) (3)),
as reported in Disciplinary Board Summaries, at 8, July 26, 1974.
74. Comment, Conflict of Interests: Multiple Defendants Represented
by a Single Court-Appointed Counsel, 74 DicK. L. REv. 241 (1970). The
author concludes that counsel is faced with a potentially unresolvable situ-
ation when appointed to represent more than one defendant in a criminal
case and that the possibility of conflict is always present where two defend-
ants are represented by the same counsel.
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tained counsel and this same counsel either volunteers or is ap-
pointed to represent a codefendant.
Each criminal defendant is entitled to have his case presented
to the jury unhampered by the attorney's duty to a codefendant.
Similar to the situation in which an attorney undertakes or con-
tinues to represent multiple plaintiffs in a civil case and one is
joined as an additional defendant, "potentially differing interests"
exist when an attorney represents multiple criminal defendants.
In such situations the provisions of DR5-105 (C) are applicable and
multiple client representation is permissible only if it is obvious that
the attorney can adequately represent the interests of each client
and each consents after a full disclosure of any possible conflicts.
Pennsylvania courts have considered the representation of
codefendants by a single attorney with a view towards protecting
the rights and interests of the individual defendant.7 5 The common
thread running through their decisions is that judicial relief is ap-
propriate when conflicting interests have existed in the dual repre-
sentation. 6 These cases serve to illustrate the limited area in
which the courts have found the representation of codefendants
to be permissible.
In situations in which the defendants are asserting antagonistic
defenses, there would appear to be unanimity that an impermissible
conflict exists. 77 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered
such a conflict in Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. RussellTh and
stated:
[A] n attorney... [may not place] ... himself in a position
where he may be required to choose between conflicting
duties or to be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting
75. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354
(1974); Commonwealth ex Tel. Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641
(1962).
76. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354
(1974); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 211 Pa. Super. 79, 234 A.2d 61 (1967).
77. United States ex rel. Watson v. Myers, 250 F. Supp. 292, 294 (E.D.
Pa. 1966) (representation of multiple defendants by a single attorney does
not comport with the sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel when the interests of the codefendants are adverse in that each
has tried to exonerate himself at the expense of the other); Commonwealth
v. Barnette, 445 Pa. 288, 290, 285 A.2d 141, 142 (1971) (counsel for each
defendant is necessary to protect against antagonistic interests in a multiple
defendants case); Commonwealth ex Tel. Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45,
48, 176 A.2d 641, 643 (appellant expressed the antagonistic interests: "I
don't see how my attorney expected to paint me white and paint Ralph
black and get a Not Guilty verdict for us both").
78. 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
interests rather than to enforce, to their full extent, the
rights of the party whom he should alone represent.
7 9
In announcing what has become known as the "prophylactic rule,"
the court held that the mere possibility of harm creates this imper-
missible conflict:
If in the representation of more than one defendant, a
conflict of interest arises, the mere existence of such con-
flict vitiates the proceedings, even though no actual harm
results. The potentiality that such harm may result rather
than such harm did result furnishes the appropriate cri-
terion.80
The pre-Code Whitling rule serves to prevent counsel's conducting
efforts on behalf of one defendant at the expense of another who
is relying on the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship. Al-
though this case was decided before the promulgation of the Code,
the reasoning is equally applicable to DR5-105, which precludes an
attorney from undertaking or continuing representation of co-
defendants with antagonistic defenses.
Dual representation does not in itself amount to a conflict
of interest, however, and when there are no "potentially differing
interests," the courts permit representation of more than one de-
fendant by a single attorney.8 ' Dual representation, thus, has been
held permissible when each defendant recited a mutually exculpat-
ing alibi that protected his confederate8 2 and when each defend-
ant had a separate trial and neither testified at -the trial of the
other.83 In Commonwealth v. Reisinger8 4 a single attorney repre-
sented two defendants in a joint trial for murder. Each defendant
confessed and testified to identical stories, admitting his own par-
ticipation, but shifting the blame to a third defendant. Convictions
were sustained, the court holding that there was a reasonable basis
79. Id. at 49, 176 A.2d at 643.
80. Id. at 48, 176 A.2d at 643. The court's holding relieves appellant
of the burden of showing that the conflict of interest arising from the dual
representation resulted in such ineffective and improper representation as
to be "basic and fundamental error."
81. Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 345, 318 A.2d 354, 356
(1974), citing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 429 Pa. 458, 463, 240 A.2d 498, 501
(1968) (attorney told client to plead guilty simply because of the over-
whelming evidence of guilt, and was thus able to bargain away a death
sentence); Commonwealth ex rel. Gallagher v. Rumble, 423 Pa. 356, 359,
223 A.2d 736, 737 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Corbin v. Myers, 419 Pa.
139, 141, 213 A.2d 356, 357 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1013 (1967).
82. Commonwealth ex rel. Gallagher v. Rumble, 423 Pa. 356, 359, 223
A.2d 736, 737 (1966).
83. Commonwealth ex rel. Corbin v. Myers, 419 Pa. 139, 141, 213 A.2d
356, 357 (1965). Cf. Commonwealth (Y. Williams, 435 Pa. 550, 553, 257 A.2d
554, 556 (1969) (consistent and substantially similar testimony at trial);
Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Duggan, 212 Pa. Super. 478, 481, 243 A.2d
184, 186, affd, 432 Pa. 357, 248 A.2d 37 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 851
(1969) (each defendant admitted his own guilt and neither attempted to
shift the blame to the other).
84. 432 Pa. 398, 248 A.2d 55 (1968).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
on which counsel sought to effectuate his client's interests.8 5 The
strategy employed by shifting the blame to a third party was found
consistent with counsel's representation of both defendants. As the
evidence indicated the guilt of both defendants, there was a rea-
sonable basis for finding no conflict of interest in representing both
defendants.8 8 Counsel said his position was not antagonistic but
was actually enhanced by the dual representation."7
Before a true conflict will arise under the Whitling rule, the
client must show at least the possibility of harm.88 The "possibility
of harm" that will require the proceedings to be vitiated in ac-
cordance with Whitling is manifested when one counsel neglects
one defendant's case in order to give the codefendant a more spirited
defense or when one defendant puts forward a defense that is incon-
sistent with the defense advanced by the other.89 In those situa-
tions the courts will find a conflict of interest that justifies the
granting of postjudgment relief. Under the Code an attorney
would be required to withdraw from employment because the inter-
ests of the codefendants became actually differing.90 It is obvious
that in those situations the attorney cannot adequately represent
the interest of each client. Continued representation would be a
violation of DR5-105(C) and would seemingly subject him to disci-
plinary proceedings. Thus, whether adopting the Whitling "pos-
sibility of harm" standard or the Code's "differing interests" rule,
representation of codefendants by a single attorney in such situa-
tions will be improper.
There is some doubt whether an attorney should ever represent
criminal codefendants. 91 The Code directs the attorney, when re-
85. Id. at 400, 248 A.2d at 56, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Washington
v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352-53 (1968), for the proposition
that counsel is effective and thus there is no conflict if there is a reasonable
basis upon which counsel seeks to effectuate his client's interests. The test
is not whether other alternatives were more reasonable.
86. Id. at 401, 248 A.2d at 56. In his dissenting opinion, however, Jus-
tice Roberts stated it matters not that each defendant told essentially the
same story because each said the other was guilty. "Had appellant had his
own counsel, he might have been advised not to testify at all, leaving
counsel free to attack on cross-examination the testimony of co-defendant
which incriminated appellant. Id. at 401, 248 A.2d at 58.
87. Id. at 400, 248 A.2d at 56.
88. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 429 Pa. 458, 463, 240 A.2d 498, 501
(1968).
89. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 345, 318 A.2d 354,
356 (1974), citing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 429 Pa. 458, 463, 240 A.2d 498,
501 (1968); Commonwealth v. Cox, 441 Pa. 64, 69, 270 A.2d 207, 209 (1970)
(plurality opinion).
90. DRS-105(B)-(C). EC5-15 stated that a lawyer should never
represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests .. .
91. Commonwealth ex reL Lucas v. Duggan, 212 Pa. Super. 478, 481-
quested to undertake or continue representation of multiple clients
having potentially differing interests, to resolve all doubts against
the propriety of the representation because of the possibility that
his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided.9 2 In a pre-
Code opinion, 93 Judge Hoffman recognized potential conflict as in-
herent whenever an attorney undertakes the representation of two
defendants, one of whom has retained him:
There is reason to suppose that counsel might be unwill-
ing to vigorously cross-examine one of his client-defend-
ants, and undermine his credibility, for the purpose of de-
fending the other. Indeed, to do so would have constituted
a conflict with regard to the co-defendant being cross-
examined. Nor should we ignore the fact that this would
have required that he attack the client who had employed
and paid him for the sake of protecting the indigent client.
9 4
Thus he found the "possibility of harm" necessary to vitiate the
proceedings under Whitling to exist in all such multiple client-
single attorney situations.
An alternative to the Whitling rule was suggested by Judge
Hoffman in Commonwealth v. Pochin. 9 Approaching the conflict
of interest issue through the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship,96 this position would further restrict multiple repre-
sentation of criminal defendants because of its finding that " [t] he
very fact of multiple representation makes it impossible to insure
the accused that his statements to the lawyer are given in full con-
fidence."
97
In questioning whether an attorney can ever represent criminal
codefendants, it appears that Judge Hoffman would impose greater
restrictions on multiple defendant representation than DR5-105.
When there are "potentially differing interests" but it is obvious
to the attorney that he can adequately represent each client's inter-
ests, DR5-105(C) permits the representation upon the clients' con-
sent after full disclosure. Judge Hoffman's opinions, however, are
not to be viewed as inconsistent with DR5-105. They merely indi-
cate a differing view about when an attorney can adequately repre-
sent the interests of each client in a multiple representation situa-
tion.
82, 243 A.2d 184, 186 (1969) (dissenting opinion); cf. Commonwealth v.
Porchin, 224 Pa. Super. 199, 200, 303 A.2d 41, 42 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
92. EC5-15.
93. Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Duggan, 212 Pa. Super. 478, 243
A.2d 184 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
94. Id. at 481-82, 243 A.2d at 186.
95. 224 Pa. Super. 199, 201, 303 A.2d 41, 42 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
96. See ABA CODE, CANON 4.
97. Commonwealth v. Porchin, 224 Pa. Super. 199, 201, 303 A.2d 41, 42
(1973) (dissenting opinion), citing A.BA PROJECT ON' STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-




The court in Commonwealth v. Breaker98 applied the Code rea-
soning to -the situation in which an attorney undertakes the repre-
sentation of criminal codefendants. Interpreting the "possibility of
harm" standard of Whitling as encompassing the Code, the court
concluded "like our 'possibility of harm' standard, the Code directs
the attorney 'to resolve all doubts against the propriety' of repre-
senting 'potentially differing interests.'-99 It appears, however,
that Breaker failed to examine the distinction between the "pos-
sibility of harm" standard of Whitling and "potentially differing
interests" within the meaning of Canon 5. These two phrases are
to be distinguished and must not be used interchangeably. Al-
though Breaker indicates that Pennsylvania decisions are in line
with the Code, it would seem that this appearance of harmony is
but a step in the direction toward true consistency. The "possi-
bility of harm" standard is applied in determining whether a crim-
inal defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel. In requiring a demonstration that a conflict of interest
actually existed, 100 it aims toward providing a remedy for the
wrong adjudged to have been committed. The Code's "potentially
differing interests" standard, however, is preventive of the "pos-
sibility of harm." It presents the practicing attorney with a guide
in undertaking or continuing multiple representation. Compliance
with DR5-105 should insure each codefendant that his case will
be presented to the jury unhampered by the attorney's duties to
the other.
Another author has suggested that the best course for Penn-
sylvania courts would be to adopt a binding rule that each defend-
ant in a multiple defendant situation be afforded an individual
counsel until it is made certain that the dangers of conflicting inter-
ests will be avoided 10 1 and that each defendant will receive the ef-
98. 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354 (1974).
99. Id. at 348, 318 A.2d at 358.
100. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
101. Comment, Conflict of Interests: Multiple Defendants Represented
by a Single Court-Appointed Counsel, 74 Dicx. L. Rav. 241 (1970).
A defense counsel's strategy is dictated by the fact that he is rep-
resenting two or more defendants accused of the same crime. He
must decide whether all or one or none of the clients should take
the stand. This decision is influenced by the risk that the defend-
ants' stories will be conflicting or that one defendant will disclose
new matter which would have an adverse affect on his co-defend-
ant. . . . Counsel will be further hampered in cross-examination
where he must constantly be aware of any affect such cross-exam-
ination will have on the other defendant (s). . . . Where one de-
fendant is more heavily involved than his co-defendant, or even
if equally involved yet. one has a prior record while the other does
not, counsel will be tempted to settle for a deal favoring the lesser
fective assistance of counsel regardless of multiple representation
by a single attorney. 10 2 In a pre-Code dissenting opinion,' °0 Judge
Hoffman considered such a rule simply because the potential con-
flict is often not recognized until after the trial begins.
1 0 4
Pennsylvania courts have not adopted this position, however,
and it is doubtful that it would be adopted when an attorney
representing one defendant later undertakes the representation of
a codefendant. Despite the language of the Breaker court, 0
it does not appear that this decision signals an adherence by the
Pennsylvania courts to the dictates of DR5-105. DR5-105(C) per-
mits dual representation only if it is obvious that the attorney can
adequately represent the interests of each client and each consents
after a full disclosure. The client is to be afforded the opportunity
to weigh the alternatives and to obtain other counsel if he so de-
sires. 10 6 The final decision about his representation thus belongs
to the client himself. In Breaker the court made reference to
a violation of DR5-105 (C) with respect to the absence of any indica-
tion that the appellant exercised any choice in the selection of an
attorney or had any opportunity to evaluate for himself whether
a codefendant's attorney would represent him with undivided
loyalty. 10 7 This reference in itself, however, does not indicate that
the courts are to regard the absence of full disclosure as an inde-
pendent ground for postjudgment relief. No mention was made of
Commonwealth v. Wideman, 08 in which judicial relief was denied
although there was a lack of evidence that "appellant was even
told of the perils of one counsel representing two co-defendants
and that the defense of one co-defendant may be compromised to
protect the interests of the other."10 19 Pennsylvania courts will not
be in accord with the Code until they recognize full disclosure by
the attorney as an absolute prerequisite to the representation of
criminal codefendants.
The ethical considerations of Canon 5 urge the attorney to avoid
the representation of multiple clients having "potentially differing
interests."1 0  Pennsylvania case law, through the "possibility of
involved defendant or for a sentence favoring the defendant with
an unblemished record.
Id. at 258-9.
102. Id. at 259.
103. Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Duggan, 212 Pa. Super. 478, 243
A.2d 184 (1969).
104. Id. at 482, 234 A.2d at 186. "It is a rare case in which counsel
can adequately represent more than one defendant and courts should be
most hesitant in allowing this."
105. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
106. EC5-16.
107. Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 349, 318 A.2d 354, 358-59
(1974).
108. 221 Pa. Super. 207, 289 A.2d 93 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 453
Pa. 119, 306 A.2d 894 (1973).




harm" standard, illustrates the instances in which it is obvious that
the attorney cannot adequately represent the interests of codefend-
ants. In other situations the decision to undertake or continue
representation involving "potentially differing interests" is left
to the individual attorney. Full compliance with DR5-105, how-
ever, is essential in order to avoid the possibility of disciplinary
action. The restrictions imposed by DR5-105 (C) upon dual repre-
sentation are thus more severe than a reading of Breaker would
indicate.
The propriety of members of the same law firm representing
codefendants requires an interpretation of DR5-105 (D). Making
reference to the Code, the court in Commonwealth v. Armbruster""
held that since a conflict of interest will not be found merely from
the fact of dual representation by one attorney, a fortiori it will
not be found from the mere fact that the attorneys for the two code-
fendants are partners. Although a lawyer may not accept employ-
ment when an associate is required to decline because of a potential
conflict of interest, the same attorney should not be acting im-
properly by accepting employment when his associate would be so
permitted.
12
Although no disciplinary board proceedings are available in
which the problem of dual representation of criminal defendants
by a single attorney has arisen, its after-the-fact determination
of the propriety of the representation would appear to approach
the examination used in Commonwealth v. Johnson."5 This court
111. 225 Pa. Super. 415, 418, 311 A.2d 672-73 (1973). This case involved
the representation of a police officer and his codefendant by attorneys who
were partners in the same firm. Appellant contended that members of one
law firm cannot effectively represent codefendants. The court held, how-
ever, that this representation was not improper in the absence of any indica-
tion of a conflict of interest as a result of which the appellant might have
been harmed. The court refused to equate dual representation with conflict
of interest.
112. DR5-105 (D). See In re Anonymous, No. 39, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup.
Ct. Disciplinary Bd., June 10, 1974). (Respondent was engaged as solicitor
to a county sheriff and was also engaged in the general practice of law.
Respondent was asked in his capacity as solicitor to advise Complainant
why a sheriff sale could not be held on a certain day. Complainant later
informed Respondent that the owners of the property over which the sales
dispute arose were represented by Respondent's partner. The Board af-
firmed the Hearing Committee's finding that there was no violation of DR5-
105 and that there was nothing improper in Respondent acting as solicitor
and either he or his partner acting for plaintiffs and defendants in matters
involving execution by the sheriff in the ordinary case), as reported in Dis-
ciplinary Board Summaries During The Period November 1, 1972 through
June 30, 1974 at 19, July 26, 1974.
113. 223 Pa. Super. 307, 299 A.2d 367 (1973).
went beyond a mere examinaLion ot the record to determine the
existence of "potentially differing interests" at the time the attor-
ney undertook the dual representation. The court considered coun-
sel's attitude, as evidenced by the sentencing stage, and attempted
to ascertain the original intention of counsel in volunteering to
represent the codefendant. By focusing on this original intent, the
court placed itself in the attorney's shoes and watched the matter
unfolding from his viewpoint. In this manner, the court objectively
determined whether the attorney could obviously represent the in-
terests of each client adequately. It was thus evident that having
initially placed himself in the position of having to either reconcile
the competing interests of his clients or sacrifice one in order to
protect the other, the attorney chose the latter.114 Further, there
was no evidence that the codefendant was ever confronted with
the ramifications of dual representation by a single attorney. It
seems that the disciplinary board would find violations of DR5-
105 (A), (B), and (C).
C. Disqualification of Counsel for the Representation of
Potentially Differing Interests
In instances in which "potentially differing interest" situations
arose, the courts' exclusive remedy was to grant postjudgment re-
lief. The Code, however, aims toward preventing this possible
wrong by setting forth the required minimum standards by
which the attorney is to determine his conduct. Disqualification
of counsel for the representation of "potentially differing interests,"
by the court and during litigation, would appear to be consistent
with the element of prevention involved in Canon 5. The avail-
ability of disqualification should be considered in connection with
the establishment of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, which is invested with the power and authority to
investigate alleged violations of the disciplinary rules.115
While recognizing that the conflict of interest question can be
raised by the court sua sponte,"16 Pennsylvania courts have con-
sidered the standing of a party to petition for removal of his
opponent's counsel for representing conflicting interests.11 7 When
114. Id. at 310, 299 A.2d at 369. See note 101 supra.
115. ENFORCEMENT R., Preamble.
116. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational
Athletic Equip. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 905, 908 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Seifert
v. Dumatic Industries, 413 Pa. 395, 399 n.5, 197 A.2d 454, 466 n.5 (1964).
117. See, e.g., Kremer v. Shoyer, 453 Pa. 22, 311 A.2d 600 (1973). In
a dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts stated:
In our adversary system of jurisprudence, one litigant may not
reject or disqualify another person's counsel. Manifestly, nothing
could be more offensive to the integrity of a judicial proceeding
than affording one party the voice to remove his adversary's law-
yer. Such a collateral source of controversy-if permitted-could
only serve to unnecessarily delay and burden the primary purpose
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the alleged conflict of interest is that of corporate counsel repre-
senting both the corporation and its officers, the courts have held
it improper for a party to move for disqualification in the absence
of some interest of petitioner that will be affected by the continued
representation." 8 In Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp.,1 9
however, such an interest was found to exist. An attorney had done
legal work for the corporation involving access to confidential in-
formation and later maintained a class action and shareholder's
derivative suit against the corporation. The court would not per-
mit the attorney
to place himself in a position where, even unconsciously,
he will be tempted, or it appears to the public and his
former clients that he might be tempted, in the interests
of his new client, to take advantage of information derived
from confidences placed in him by [a former client]. 120
Canon 4 of the Code deals with the preservation of confidences
and secrets of the client placed in the lawyer. This preservation
outlasts the termination of employment and the lawyer is required
to maintain inviolate these confidences reposed in him. "Poten-
tially differing interests" thus surface when an attorney accepts
employment and the subject matter is closely connected with the
subject matter of a prior representation. The absence of actual dis-
closure does not obviate the necessity of disqualification, as the op-
portunity for improper disclosure creates an appearance of impro-
priety that must be avoided.' 21
In Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational
and Athletic Equipment Corp.122 the conflict of interest question
of the proceedings-without in any way advancing its legitimate
objectives or the quality of the inquiry.
Id. at 38-9, 311 A.2d at 609 (dissenting opinion). Accord, Otis & Co., v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'd, 155 F.2d 522
(3d Cir. 1946).
118. Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. Pa.
1944). See Seifert v. Dumatic Industries, 413 Pa. 395, 399 n.5, 197 A.2d 454,
456 n.5 (1964) (court questioned the standing of petitioner).
119. 133 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
120. Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir.
1972).
121. Id. at 1385-86. Accord, Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478
F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) (the court applied a strict "prophylactic" rule in
disqualifying a lawyer for representing a plaintiff against a corporation
which he had previously represented on a related matter); Hull v. Celanese,
375 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (company's attorney became friendly with
plaintiff and conferred with plaintiff's attorneys; disqualification of plain-
tiff's attorneys necessary although there was no actual disclosure).
122. 357 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
arose in a suit in which attorneys appeared both for a corporation
and for one of its officers whose services were terminated after the
initiation of the action. The court found potential violations of DR
5-105(A)-(C) and EC5-15 and 16 if the attorneys were to use infoi'-
mation derived from the officer while he was their client for the
purpose of discrediting and refuting his testimony. 123 The court
refused to disqualify counsel, however, until there was a demonstra-
tion of an actual conflict of interest. This holding would thus ap-
pear at variance with the recognized rule of conflict of interest that
the test of a conflicting interest is not the actuality of conflict but
the possibility that conflict may arise.
124
The Universal decision though must be be restricted to its
facts and is not to be construed as a general departure from the
"possibility of conflict" rule. The court relied on a "floodgate"
approach in distinguishing the situation in which "potentially differ-
ing interests" arise for the first time in an original law suit from that
in which the conflict arises from possible use of confidential infor-
mation acquired in prior litigation. This court found the former
situation acceptable because otherwise a corporate officer who is
also a codefendant in a case with the corporation could terminate
his relationship with the corporation and cause the disqualification
of corporate counsel.125
At the same time, Universal demonstrates the desirability of
allowing courts to make pendente lite a determination of the neces-
sity to disqualify counsel. When a question of conflict of interest
is raised in the area of multiple representation, there must be some
interest of a party that may potentially be affected by the attor-
ney's representation of another. 126 A judicial determination that
there is no possibility of "potentially differing interests" becoming
actually "differing" 12' or that there are no interests that are "po-
tentially differing"'128 obviates the necessity for further inquiry
into these questions.
123. Id. at 907.
124. See, e.g., Middleberg v. Middleberg, 427 Pa. 114, 115, 233 A.2d 889,
890 (1967); Seifert v. Dumatic Industries, 413 Pa. 395, 398, 197 A.2d 454, 455,
(1964) citing Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 135 A.2d
252 (1957).
125. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational &
Athletic Equip. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 905, 908 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
126. See notes 117-120 and accompanying text supra.
127. EC5-15 directs the attorney to avoid undertaking the representa-
tion of potentially differing interests because of the possibility that these
interests may actually become differing. Where there is no possibility that
the interests of his clients may become differing, the attorney's professional
judgment will not be impaired by the multiple representation. Compliance
with DR5-105(C) will not be required. EC5-17 suggests that the attorney
follow a case-by-case approach to multiple representation situations involv-
ing potentially differing interests.




Both Richardson and Universal require balancing of conflict-
ing policies-avoidance of professional impropriety and appearance
of impropriety under the Code and protection of the litigant's right
to counsel of his choice.12 9 Striking this balance is especially im-
portant because neither orders for disqualification 130 nor orders
refusing to disqualify are appealable. 131 In Middleberg v. Middle-
berg,13 2 the court in quashing the appeal held that although the
order disqualifying an attorney for representation of conflicting in-
terests "may be final as to counsel, it is interlocutory as to the party
represented by him."' 13  Such order does not terminate litigation
by precluding the party from action in the court of original jurisdic-
tion, but it does have the effect of limiting a party's right to counsel
of his choice.3 4
In accordance with Richardson and Universal, the federal dis-
trict courts have the power and duty to examine the charge that
an attorney is representing conflicting interests since it is "that
court which is authorized to supervise the conduct of the members
of its bar."'' 3 Disqualification is thus appropriate if deemed neces-
sary to preserve public confidence and to guard the image of the
legal profession. 136 In Pennsylvania, however, the Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is invested with the
"power and duty to consider and investigate the conduct of any
attorney"'3 7 practicing in the Commonwealth and charged with
professional impropriety. Violations of the disciplinary rules con-
stitute misconduct and are grounds for attorney discipline. 38 Al-
though the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has "inherent and ex-
clusive power to supervise the conduct of attorneys who are its of-
129. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational &
Athletic Equip. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 905, 906 (W.D. Pa. 1973), citing Richard-
son v. Hamilton ,Int'l Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
130. Middleberg v. Middleberg, 427 Pa. 114, 116, 233 A.2d 889, 891
(1967).
131. Seifert v. Dumatic Industries, 413 Pa. 395, 401, 197 A.2d 454, 457
(1964).
132. 427 Pa. 114, 233 A.2d 889 (1967).
133. Id. at 116, 233 A.2d at 891.
134. Id.
135. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational &
Athletic Equip. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 905, 909 (W.D. Pa. 1973), citing
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1049, 1052-53 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
136. Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
137. ENFORCEMENT R. 17-5(C) (1).
138. ENFORCEMENT R. 17-3.
ficers,"''15 this power should not be interpreted to deny courts the
authority to disqualify counsel for violations of Canon 5.140 But
even if the disciplinary board has not pre-empted the court's power
to disqualify counsel, the question arises whether the prevention
of the representation of conflicting interests is a sufficiently com-
pelling reason to justify infringement upon the constitutionally
guaranteed right to counsel. 4 1
In Kremer v. Shoyer'42 the court was faced with the question
of disqualification of counsel for an alleged violation of DR5-107
(A).143 Although the majority opinion resolved the matter without
reaching the merits of the substantive issues, 44 the case is signifi-
cant in that the concurring and dissenting opinions illustrate the
parameters of the disqualification question. Justices Pomeroy 146
and Nix 1 46 both recognized that the attorney had complied with
the formal requisites of DR5-107 (A). Since the client was fully
aware of the circumstances of his representation and the possibility
that the attorney's judgment might be impaired, disqualification
seemingly would not have been warranted. But the question of
disqualification arose during a judicial inquiry into the unethical
conduct of the lawyer who paid the attorney involved in the instant
case. Justice Pomeroy thus considered disqualification necessary
to maintain the integrity of the court in the face of appearances
of professional impropriety. 4 7 Emphasizing the attorney's compli-
ance with the requirements of DR5-107(A), Justice Nix found
disqualification unwarranted, however, because "public confidence
139. ENFORCEMENT R., Preamble.
140. See ENFORCEMENT R. 17-1. As to the jurisdiction of the discipli-
nary board: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to deny to any
other court such powers as are necessary for the court to maintain control
over proceedings conducted before it . .. ."
Contra, Kremer v. Shoyer, 453 Pa. 22, 38, 311 A.2d 600, 609 (1973) (dissent-
ing opinion): "If respondents assert professional impropriety by Mr.
Kremer, that becomes a matter for the Disciplinary Board ......
141. Kremer v. Shoyer, 453 Pa. 22, 41, 311 A.2d 600, 608 (1973) (dissent-
ing opinion).
142. 453 Pa. 22, 311 A.2d 600 (1973). A client of attorney X-l was sub-
poened to testify at a special judicial investigation of X-1 with respect to
a certain personal injury case in which X-1 had served as his counsel.
When the client appeared with Mr. Kremer as his attorney, Mr. Kremer
was disqualified by order of the court on the ground that there was a con-
flict of interest due to the fact that Mr. Kremer was being paid by X-1
and not by the client.
143. DR5-107 (A) states that a lawyer shall not accept compensation for
his legal service from one other than his client except with the consent of
his client after full disclosure.
144. Kremer v. Shoyer, 453 Pa. 22, 23, 311 A.2d 600, 601-02 (1973). The
disqualification was held not to create a situation of "extreme necessity"
so as to justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition, and mandamus did
not lie in the instant case.
145. Id. at 28, 311 A.2d at 602 (concurring opinion).
146. Id. at 39, 311 A.2d at 607 (dissenting opinion).
147. Id. at 36, 311 A.2d at 606-07 (concurring opinion).
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in our legal system will only be eroded when there is no attempt
to disclose 'potentially differing interest.' "148
Canon 5 of the Code is directed solely to the protection of the
client by insuring that he receives the attorney's professional judg-
ment free from any compromising influences. Disqualification ap-
pears necessary to prevent the continued representation of differing
interests, whether there is a substantial risk of actual conflict or
only an appearance of professional impropriety because the attor-
ney's judgment may be impaired. Disciplinary board action is not
an effective alternative for prevention of the harm. 149 But if the
court attempts to use disqualification solely to guard its integrity
against appearances of impropriety, especially when the attorney
has complied with the applicable provisions of Canon 5, its action
should be deemed an infringement upon the individual's right to
counsel. The disciplinary board seemingly provides an alternative
to disqualification for the maintenance of public confidence in the
legal profession.
IV. CONCLUSION
In providing for the limitation on business relations with the
client and restricting multiple client representation, Canon 5 aims
toward the maintenance of the attorney's independent professional
judgment on behalf of his client. The sole purpose of the discipli-
nary rules is to protect the client from any influences that might
impair the judgment of his attorney. These provisions are only to
be applied in furtherance of this goal and compliance should suffice
to insure the client of his attorney's undivided loyalty.
The limitation on business relations is intended to prevent the
situation in which an attorney's own interests influence his profes-
sional judgment to the detriment of his client. When there has
been a full disclosure of all circumstances concerning a possible
dilution of loyalty, however, the attorney has fully complied with
DR5-104 (A). The client should not thereafter complain that his
attorney's profits were at the expense of the protection of his in-
terests.
Although multiple client representation should be scrutinized
carefully when there are multiple plaintiffs in a civil action or crim-
inal codefendants, DRS-105 does not prohibit it, but compliance
148. Id. at 42-43, 311 A.2d at 609 (dissenting opinion).
149. In Moore v. Jamieson, 451 Pa. 299, 311 A.2d 283 (1973), the court
held that infringement on the right to counsel-can only be justified when
there is no nonburdensome alternative for achieving the desired result.
with the provisions of DR5-105 (C) is required. When it is
obvious that the attorney can adequately represent the interests
of both, the clients must be afforded the opportunity to evaluate
the need for individual counsel. The clients are not provided this
opportunity unless the attorney fully discloses the possible influ-
ences on his professional judgment arising from the multiple repre-
sentation.
Canon 9 recognizes another interest, besides the client's, to be
protected in situations involving "potentially differing interests."'1 50
Public confidence in the legal profession demands that even the
appearance of impropriety be avoided.15 ' On the other hand, it
would seem that when an attorney has complied with the provisions
of the disciplinary rules, he has acted to protect his client's interests.
Disqualification of counsel in such a situation would not be justified
solely to maintain public confidence.
While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper con-
duct that has a tendency to diminish public confidence in
the legal system or the legal profession, his duty to clients
or to the public should never be subordinated merely be-
cause the full discharge of his obligation may be misun-
derstood or may tend to subject him or the legal profession
to criticism.
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150. ABA CODE, CANON 9. See EC9-1, -2, -6.
151. Kremer v. Shoyer, 453 Pa. 22, 36, 311 A.2d 600, 606 (1973) (concur-
ring opinion), citing Canon 9.
152. EC9-2.
